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Abstract 
The article seeks to explain and understand the contradictions within universalistic claims of feminism. It also 
highlights the challenges the Women’s Movement is facing within the philosophical tenets of feminism. The 
paper begins by defining feminism and universalism from class and cultural points of view in relation to human 
rights. Then it analyzes not only the tensions between feminism and universalism (in relation to culture and class) 
but also shows similarities and parallels between them. This paper concludes by reviewing the challenges for 
Women’s Rights as Human Rights from feminism. Taking into consideration class and cultural factors and 
challenges to Women’s Universal Human Rights Movement, the paper argues that both must work together by 
making changes with regard to human rights (women and men) violations not only at the international level but 
also at national and local levels. 
Keywords: feminism, universalism, culture, relativism and human rights 
1. Introduction 
The universalist claims of feminism in general and of the international feminist movement in particular owe their 
intellectual origin within the grand narratives of Marxian philosophy on the economic subjugation of women 
based on the gender division of labour. Men and women are defined differently in patriarchal and capitalist 
societies based on their access to or denials of productive resources based in both public sphere and private 
sphere. Kollontai (1927) in her forward to the English edition of her novel ‘Red Love’ writes about the way our 
societies deal with men and women. “The character of a man is evaluated not by his conduct in family morals, 
but by his efficiency in work, by his intellect, his will, his usefulness to the State and Society” but for women, it 
is all about her loyalties and “display of “good morals” in sexual and family life (ibid)”. Economic subjugation 
of women is impossible without the bourgeois hypocrisy and its narratives of moral values; a mechanism of 
control life, labour and society. Patriarchal cultural norms are constructed to uphold structures of power that are 
detrimental towards the emancipation of women in general and materialise in the goals of women’s right as 
human right in particular. 
In recent years the issue of ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’ (Okin, 1998) has increasingly gained prevalence 
and validity within the international community. However, the call for Women’s Universal Human Rights 
appears not to avoid problems and challenges, even from the feminist movement itself. The challenge for 
women’s rights as human rights is the question of ‘‘how can human rights be authorized in radically different 
societies without succumbing either to homogenizing universalism or the paralysis of cultural relativism? 
(Coomaraswami, 1994). It means the diversity of cultures in different societies stands as a threat to the human 
rights movement in general. 
2. The Nature of Feminism, Universalism, and Cultural Relativism 
Women’s rights have become a centerpiece of international human rights debates in the last decade. An 
international commitment to universal human rights was made in 1945 under the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights, and in 1979 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) signified the status accorded to women’s rights at the international level. Over 160 countries from all 
regions of the world and all religions have signed CEDAW (Chinkin, 1999). Though most feminists have 
www.ccsenet.org/jpl Journal of Politics and Law Vol. 6, No. 2; 2013 
84 
 
claimed as a victory the inclusion of ‘women’s rights as human rights’, problems have since emerged relating to 
the universal nature of the claim by feminists for women’s rights. Feminism’s primary aim in relation to human 
rights discourse has been to expand both the definition of who holds human rights, and to expand on what 
constitutes human rights; ‘all strands of feminist critique aim at the inclusion of women in the human rights 
system’ (Brems, 1997:141). Feminism advocates the incorporation of women’s rights into the discourse of 
international human rights, and seeks to expand human rights to encompass women’s concerns.  
However, this incorporation of women’s rights into human rights discourse varies from the appeal for the simple 
inclusion of women into the current human rights system, to the call by some feminists for a radical re-definition 
and re-formulation of human rights. Feminist critiques of human rights argue that the current dominant human 
rights discourse reflects the ‘needs and aspirations of men,’ (Mallick, 1998) and also argue that women’s needs 
and aspirations need to be brought into human rights theory and practice. Feminism views human rights through 
a gendered lens, with an emphasis on the ways in which women experience human rights violations. Feminism 
requires the acknowledgement that women share some commonalities, regardless of their differences. These 
commonalities may include discrimination or oppression based on sex/gender and a critique of the patriarchal 
system. Feminists recognize that women around the world are more likely to experience poverty, domestic 
violence, and rape (Peach, 2001); thus, there is a need to work towards women’s rights as human rights. The 
universalist human rights position argues that all human beings share the same inalienable rights (Mayer, 1995). 
Orend (2002:15) notes that ‘every human being holds human rights’ and that this commitment to universality is 
an inherent requirement of human rights. Universalists argue that human rights ‘derive from the essence of 
humanity’, and as such cannot be taken away (Bell, et.al, 2001). Therefore, it is argued that international 
principles can enforce basic human rights and compel states to alter their norms and treatments of citizens in 
order to comply with human rights. While those ascribing to a universal belief of human rights may 
acknowledge that cultures are different, they counter that similarities amongst individuals ‘should prevail over 
cultural differences’ (Bell, et. al, 2001). Cultural relativists argue that values and norms are specific to cultures, 
thus, there cannot be one set of universal values and norms on which human rights are based. Cultural relativists 
make the claim that human rights reflect Western values and norms, not those subscribed to by non-Western 
cultures (Mayer, 1995). Cultural relativists argue that societies and cultures should not be judged, and 
consequently condemned, for human rights violations based on relative Western values (Mayer, 1995). Cultural 
relativists point out that the Western oriented individual rights framework of human rights is not applicable to 
many non-Western cultures to which individual rights are a foreign concept, as these cultures are collective or 
group oriented (Mallick, 1998). Cultural relativists argue that by imposing universal norms and rights, one is 
only acting to bury cultural differences (Bunting, 1993). However, it should be noted that not all cultural 
relativists reject outright the entire concept of human rights; rather, many cultural relativists reject specific 
human rights claims or the specific context and interpretation of a rights claim (Brems, 1997). For human rights 
to be universal there is an inherent requirement that human rights themselves be viewed as universal. There is a 
fear amongst human rights advocates that cultural relativism can create ‘paralysis’ in the sphere of human rights 
and that it only serves as a barrier to enforcing human rights, especially those of women (Bunting, 1997). In 
addition, one must also recognize that though human beings are members of a particular cultural group, they are 
also ‘members of an international or global community in which they have been recognized as bearing certain 
human rights’ (Peach, 2001). 
3. Contradictions between Feminism and Cultural Relativism 
Feminists fear that cultural relativism will act as a barrier towards the increasing recognition of women’s rights 
as human rights, and towards the enforcement of women’s rights (Bunting, 1993). Due to this fear, the prevailing 
position amongst feminists, especially Western feminists, has traditionally been to oppose cultural relativism. 
Thus, there exist ongoing tensions between feminism and cultural relativism. Feminism calls for changes to be 
made to cultures so that they do not continue to discriminate against women, while cultural relativism counters 
that it is ‘culturally appropriate’ to ascribe specific roles to women and treat women in a particular manner 
(Brems, 1997). Bunting (1993) elaborates on the feminist position, stating that ‘custom’ is seen as something 
which perpetuates the subordination of women to men. Culture is seen as an impediment to the implementation 
of universal norm. This resistance by feminists towards cultural relativism is furthered by Rao (1995) who states, 
‘no social group has suffered greater violation of its human rights in the name of culture than women’.  
Feminists often view cultural relativism as the continuation of male dominance and women’s oppression (Brems, 
1997). This tension has meant that the furthering of women’s rights as human rights, has often been directly at 
the expense of cultural relativists’ claim and cultural diversity. Nowadays, it is generally observed that numerous 
tensions still exist between feminism and cultural relativism. In many cultures women’s position in the society is 
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viewed as integral to the continuation and assertion of culture; ‘women are exalted as the custodians of culture, 
the spiritual center of the nation’ (Coomaraswamy, 1999). Cultures are thus often defined by the roles they 
ascribe to women (Chinkin, 1999). This is the reason why those who support a cultural relativist position are 
often most resistant to women’s universal human rights. As women are often viewed as symbolically 
representing culture (Rao, 1995), any alteration to women’s role and status within the society is viewed as an 
alteration to the foundation of the culture itself. Elmadmad (2002) argues that in most Muslim societies today, 
there are norms related to women and families that primarily characterize these societies as Islamic.  
In addition, women’s roles in many cultures are primarily relegated to the private sphere which is also viewed as 
central to culture, and therefore, an aspect of culture which should not be penetrated by international norms. 
Thus women’s human rights, which threaten to pierce the impermeable private sphere of culture, are seen as 
especially threatening by those claiming cultural relativism. Another source of tension for feminism in relation to 
cultural relativism depends on who is making cultural relativist claim?. Feminists argue that it is often elite men, 
who are in control of the state or society, who make claims of cultural relativism. Feminists point out that when 
male leaders make claims of cultural relativism, it is often in defense of a custom which is oppressive towards 
women (Rao, 1995:17). Rao also states that when a claim of cultural relativism is made one must ask ‘what is 
the status of the speaker making the claim,’ and ‘in whose name is the argument for cultural relativism being 
advanced’. Feminists also argue that though these male leaders claim to speak for the culture as a whole, the 
women whom the customs and human rights principles would affect are often silenced within the culture of male 
dominance and female acceptance. Mayer (1995) argues that states which make cultural relativist claims often go 
to extensive lengths in order to stifle women’s voices, which are often of dissent and serve to discredit the claim 
of cultural relativism. Mayer further argues that some Islamic governments have even gone to the extent of 
outlawing feminist groups which challenge the dominant Islamic culture and, thus, threaten claims of cultural 
relativism. Chinkin (1999) points out that few advances for women in the realm of human rights will be made as 
long as it is male leaders, who argue that women’s roles are integral to culture, speaking for women.  
Another criticism made by feminists towards cultural relativism is that it is often the powerful and elite in society, 
most often men, who determine what is considered to be ‘culture,’ and thus, what can be defended from a 
cultural relativist perspective. Rao (1995) cautions that not all groups have the same access to culture or the same 
influence in the creation of culture. Mayer (1995) argues that the vision of culture articulated by the dominant 
elite in a society is not necessarily representative of all individuals within that culture; rather, culture is often 
challenged from below, from women and other marginalized groups. Singer (1999:47) argues that the 
international community should acknowledge that were women given the opportunity to determine what is 
integral to their culture, ‘they would most likely reject the elites’ version’. Feminists charge that claims of 
cultural relativism ignore the fact that cultures are not static and cohesive, but that they are multiple in nature and 
constantly evolving. Rao (1995:172) argues that culture is a ‘series of constantly contested and negotiated social 
practices whose meanings are influenced by the power and status of their interpreters and participants’. Claims 
of cultural relativism also imply that maintaining a cultural practice is beneficial to the society as a whole, when 
in fact; the practice may only benefit certain segments of the culture. Feminists also find problematic the 
reservations made by countries to international human rights treaties, which nullify certain aspects of the human 
rights declaration in the name of culture and religion. 
Many countries claim reservations against certain sections of a human rights treaty or declaration to which they 
are party, on the basis of cultural or religious grounds. Mayer (1995) notes that while reservations are not 
supposed to violate the principle aims and goals of a treaty, often reservations do just that. She cites the example 
of many Islamic countries reservations to CEDAW, in order to preserve Islamic culture and religion; yet the 
purpose of CEDAW was to ‘change cultural constructs which were a barrier to women’s equality’ (Mayer, 
1995:179). In the end, many feminist critics argue that the result of reservations is continued discrimination 
against women and that ‘claims from diverse states and regions to culture turn out to have the same consequence 
– denying women equal rights’ (Mayer, 1995:185). Mayer (1995:185) makes the claim that reservations based on 
cultural relativism are often ‘nothing more than disguises for the universality of male determination to cling to 
power and privilege’. 
4. Universalism – Claims of Essentialism? 
Feminism has been dismissive of cultural relativism due to the tensions noted above, however, this absence of a 
cultural difference perspective has meant that women’s rights have traditionally been formulated in an 
universalistic and essentialist manner (Bunting, 1993:6). It is alleged that feminists calling for universal human 
rights base their claim to rights on a Western, white middle class women’s perspective. According to Elizabeth 
Grosz (Bunting, 1993:11), “essentialism entails that those characteristics defined as women’s essence are shared 
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in common by all women at all times”. The claim by feminists for a universal women’s experience, which is the 
basis for women’s human rights is alleged to, ‘assume that all women have similar attributes and experiences and 
ignore the impact of other variables such as race, class, wealth, and sexual preferences on the position of women’ 
(Charlesworth, 1994:62). It is further argued, that while calling for the inclusion of women’s rights, feminists 
have in fact excluded others on the basis of ethnicity, class, religion, and sexuality. Spelman (1988:3) cautions 
that ‘any attempt to talk about all women in terms of something we have in common undermines attempts to talk 
about the differences amongst us’. Cultural relativists charge that the essentialist position taken by many 
feminists is merely another instance of Western values and norms being imposed on non-Western countries in an 
imperialistic and neo-colonial manner. 
It has become increasingly difficult for feminists to ignore the allegations from cultural relativists that feminists’ 
claims for human rights are Western based, as simultaneously feminists are claiming that human rights are male 
based. Bunting (1993:10) cautions that it is problematic for feminists to dismiss cultural relativism as it leads to a 
strategy of human rights which is only ‘relevant to a minimum of women in the world’. She further argues that to 
dismiss cultural relativism is to ignore the simultaneous oppressions which may be present in the violation of 
women’s rights. Based, on these realizations, many feminists are now re-examining cultural relativist arguments 
and new ‘strains of feminism … characterized by pluralism’ are emerging which acknowledge the fact that the 
experiences of all women will not be identical (Elshtain, 1995:544). There is now an attempt by many stands of 
feminism to ‘understand the world through the eyes of others’ (Elshtain, 1995:557), and to recognize that women 
vary across class, ethnicity, age, ability, sexual orientation and culture.  
5. Feminism and Cultural Relativism - Similarities 
Emerging feminist theories which attempt to be non-essentialist have reduced tensions between feminism and 
cultural relativism (Brems, 1997:155). In fact, it is argued by some feminists, that feminism and cultural 
relativism actually have many similarities, and if the two groups could see beyond their differences, together 
they could provide a valuable critique of dominant human rights discourse. ‘If cultural relativists and feminists 
stopped wasting their breath and energy on issues on which they are opposed and focused instead on issues they 
have in common, they could develop a powerful constructive human rights critique’ (Brems, 1997:164). Both 
feminists and cultural relativists analyze human rights from a particular perspective and through a particular lens; 
feminists analyze human rights through a gender lens, while cultural relativists analyze human rights through the 
lens of culture. Feminists view the claim that existing human rights are universal as problematic as they see the 
present construction of ‘universal’ as deeply gendered, with women’s concerns largely ignored, and the 
‘universal’ premised on the needs and concerns of men (Bunting, 1993:8). Similarly, cultural relativists challenge 
the claim of universalism made by human rights, as they argue that human rights are culturally specific to 
Western norms and values, excluding the norms and values of non-Western cultures. Both feminists and cultural 
relativists view universal human rights as reflecting the values of a select few and excluding the perspectives of 
others, such as women and those from non-Western cultures.  
Therefore, both feminists and cultural relativists call for the inclusion of their perspectives, gender and cultural 
diversity, within human rights discourse (Brems, 1997:154). Feminists and cultural relativists argue that in order 
for human rights to be the rights of all, they must not be gender or culture blind.  
Feminists and cultural relativists also criticize the abstract theory which characterizes human rights discourse. 
Feminists call for a ‘contextual and experiential’ approach to human rights (Brems, 1997:141), while cultural 
relativists argue that the particularities of each cultural context must be recognized. Both feminists and cultural 
relativists call for a return to the particular context of gender or culture as the basis of analysis, whereby the 
‘abstract individual’ is replaced within a ‘situated, connected self’ (Brems, 1997:156). Additionally, both 
feminists and cultural relativists criticize the priority given in human rights discourse towards civil and political 
rights, over social and economic rights. Feminists and cultural relativists argue that social and economic rights 
are of particular importance to women and non-Western cultures; thus, the priority given to civil and political 
rights is problematic and reflects the Western and male biases of human rights discourse. 
6. Future Challenges and Alternatives 
It is evident that there exist simultaneously both tensions and similarities between feminism and cultural 
relativism; therefore, many challenges remain in the future for women’s rights as human rights. Clearly, in their 
appeal for women’s rights, feminists face the challenge of trying to strike a delicate balance between the 
requirement that women’s rights be universal for all women, and the particularities of cultural diversity which 
acknowledge the differences amongst women. This is a difficult balance for feminists who must ‘avoid both 
elevating the experience of a specific group to the human ‘norm,’ and the relativistic paralysis of endorsing all 
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pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid’ (Brems, 1997:159). One possible reconciliation 
between these tensions may be the acknowledgement that the dichotomy between universalism and relativism is 
an artificial construct (Rao, 1995:168). An argument is made that universality does not necessarily require 
uniformity, therefore, human rights should be extended to be truly universal and inclusive of all (Brems, 
1997:164). Brems (1997:163) proposes that while rights may be universal, the right to exercise them over culture 
is up to individuals; she states, ‘each individual should have the right to practice his or her culture and traditions, 
but likewise, each individual should have the right to reject them’. There is also a proposal put forth that it is 
possible to change particular discriminatory practices within a culture, without changing the culture itself. 
Kisaakye (2002) argues that despite the fact that a discriminatory cultural practice may be altered, many other 
aspects of culture remain, such as food, language, dance, and clothing. Another potential solution is put forth in 
the notion that perhaps feminism itself can serve as a compromise between universalism and cultural relativism 
(Bell, 1999:151). Bell (1999:151) argues that feminist theory is beneficial as it succeeds in evading both 
‘homogenizing universalism or the paralysis of cultural relativism’. Elshtain (1995) echoes this argument stating 
that a global feminist consciousness can create feminisms which are unique to regions and develop from within 
women’s existing culture, thus making feminism appropriate to the particular needs of women in various regions 
and cultures. Elshtain further argues that these feminisms, which originate in diverse regions, can serve to build 
bridges between dissimilar regions and cultures, without imposing one version of feminism on all women. 
Bunting (1993) also agrees with this line of thought, stating that feminisms must emerge which are particular to 
culture and region, in order that they can work against discrimination and oppression in ways which are 
culturally appropriate to their community. Some feminist theorists have come up with particular theories to 
address and reconcile the tensions between universalism and cultural relativism for feminists. One of them is 
Peach (2001) who develops a ‘feminist pragmatic theory’ about reconciliation of the tensions between 
universalism and cultural relativism within feminism, in which theory and practice are inseparable in the 
endeavor towards increasing and implementing women’s rights. The primary consideration for Peach is which 
strategies of asserting women’s rights are most effective in a particular context. She argues that in some contexts 
the approach of international human rights principles may be appropriate, while in other contexts this strategy 
would be ineffective as the framework for women to make rights claims does not exist within all cultures. Peach 
argues that in some contexts depending upon the presence of a ‘rights consciousness’, the risk of backlash 
against international human rights, the historical experience of others using a legal rights approach, and whether 
there is sufficient agreement amongst the affected women to claim a particular right, that in fact education, 
literacy, and communal ownership of land may grant more benefit to the affected women. Peach uses the 
example of Thailand, where women’s rights are violated daily in the sex trade. Peach argues that merely 
asserting the fact that women’s international human rights are being violated is of no benefit to the women in the 
Thai sex trade; women in Thailand remain in the sex trade as there are few opportunities for women to engage in 
waged employment. Thus, in this particular context Peach argues it would be most beneficial to implement 
strategies which provide alternate sources of waged employment for women. Pragmatically, feminist theory 
allows for human rights to be universally held by all women, however, it also allows for the acknowledgement of 
cultural diversity, as it recognizes that the assertion of these universal human rights may not always be the most 
effective strategy to empower women. Peach’s pragmatic theory is well complemented by Donnelly’s theoretical 
conception of human rights, in which he advocates for ‘weak cultural relativism,’ whereby strong universal 
rights exist, but there can exist in some cultural variation in the level of ‘form’ and ‘implementation’ (Donnelly, 
1989:110). Similar to Peach’s strategy, Donnelly (1989:124) argues that ‘it may be necessary to allow limited 
cultural variations in the form and interpretation of particular human rights, but we must insist on their 
fundamental moral universality’.  
While feminists must be cautious not to be essentialist in their claims for universal human rights, I would argue 
that, despite the differences and diversity amongst women, there also exist some commonalities. Lange (1993) 
argues that the predominant problem with essentialist critiques of feminism is that they ‘disable feminism as a 
political movement’. Without some acknowledgement of the similarities amongst women, there exists neither the 
basis for either feminism, nor for the call of ‘women’s rights as human rights’. Peach (2001) argues that it is not 
essentialist to make claims on behalf of ‘women’ if one can demonstrate that there are in fact commonalities 
amongst women. She states that the devaluation of women’s work, the feminization of poverty, and violence 
against women are commonalties shared by women around the world. Similarly, Charlesworth (1994:62) argues 
that there exist commonalities amongst women; she states that although manifested differently within different 
societies, patriarchy and the devaluation of women are ‘almost universal’. Okin (1994) argues that while women 
of different classes, ethnicities, and regions may experience sexism slightly differently, they are still experience 
sexism. Okin further argues that while there are differences amongst women, gender remains an important 
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category of analysis and argues that one should not be paralyzed by women’s differences. Lange (1993:199) 
concludes that ‘without some notion of women as a category of the oppressed, women stand to continue to be 
more silenced than men within the class, culture, race, or nation, where they find themselves’.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
While feminism must be cautious not to make essentialist claims of universality amongst women, one must also 
be cautious in the acceptance of cultural relativist claims. The question remains, how can human rights be 
‘authorized in radically different societies without succumbing to either homogenizing universalism or the 
paralysis of cultural relativism?’ (Cook, 1994:7). Despite the fact that no definite conclusions have emerged in 
this analysis of feminism, universalism, and cultural relativism but still women’s rights as universal human rights 
is the need of the hour. Though clearly international human rights must become more responsive towards the 
diversity of women, universal commonalities exist amongst women. These commonalities amongst women are 
the basis for the claim of ‘women’s rights as human rights.’ In a more theoretical sense, we can argue that the 
‘self’ shares its uniqueness and differences with ‘others’; the ‘other’ is one among us. Therefore, the universalist 
claim of women’s right as human right stands on a higher philosophical terrain. 
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